24 February 2003

NEWSMAKERS

 

Branching Out
It finally looks as though something might be done about the bloated Banque de France. As the Eurosystem is pelted with criticism of its startling surfeit of central bankers, France is surely the chief culprit, riddled with 211 regional branches (compare that with the Bank of England’s 14). The BdF of course knows this, but runs up against dogged resistance from the unions when it has actually tried to do anything about it. But now Jean-Claude Trichet, France’s governor, has in his possession a new report recommending the eventual closure of the bulk of the bank’s largely superfluous branches. And it’s a report he commissioned!

Trichet should be congratulated for consistently attempting to point out the impossibilities of justifying the existence of the ubiquitous branches, which are a hangover from the nineteenth century when such ubiquity was deemed necessary to provide local discounting facilities, distribute notes and coins, arbitrate in local disputes and ensure the solvency of banks. He recently said that it was “imperative to pursue efforts made in recent years to modernise the BdF, rationalise its structures and adapt its activities and operating conditions to new developments.”

Over the past decade he has managed to cut about 2,500 employees through a policy of non-replacement. But his talk about adapting the structures of the bank to “allow it to perform its duties more satisfactorily and more efficiently” implies that the current structure is still far from efficient. The report looks at four ways of improving the BdF’s structure and in the end plumps for maintaining a network of 62 permanent sites (37 fully-fledged branches, 8 branches without cash activities and 17 currency circulation centres), supplemented by 51 customer service and information offices.

Indeed, with the introduction of the euro, and the transfer of many responsibilities to the ECB, most people would agree that a shake-up is needed. But already the indignant French unions, together with the national association of mayors, are digging in their heels. They say that 3,200 jobs will be lost, and they encouraged some 62% of the 8,000 branch employees to go on strike last week. In an attempt to soothe worker worries, the BdF has insisted that it has “no intention of making any employees redundant” and in any case that “no decision has as yet been taken”. Leaving no doubt that it is in no rush to do anything rash, the central bank assured that there will first be an “extended period of consultation with trade unions and the relevant elected representatives” before even a “preliminary” decision is taken.

Let’s hope these are just evasive tactics to get the unions off its back: the sooner something is done about the Eurosystem’s legions of central bankers, the better. Click here to find out more about the report on the BdF’s website: http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/actu/main.htm?menu2=menu_m1.htm&page=discours/24.htm


Trichet Left Clutching At Straws
A further blow was delivered to Jean-Claude Trichet’s claims to the ECB throne when it was announced that the verdict on his trial will not be made known for another four months, on 18 June. Newsmakers’ sympathies go out to the poor man. The state prosecutor would even have Trichet serve a ten-month suspended jail sentence for his alleged misdemeanours. French courts attribute this uncommon delay in reaching a verdict (it had been assumed they would ask for two months or so) to the so-called “complexity” of the evidence they are grappling with: it seems more like water-torture to us. And this verdict is merely three weeks before Wim Duisenberg has promised to bid adieu to his ECB comrades, on 9 July.

Even if Trichet’s name is cleared, if the wayward and troublesome French lawyers acting against Trichet are to remain true to form, they will appeal the verdict. This could spell the end to Trichet’s dreams, and even if they don’t appeal, Christa Randzio-Plath, head of the European Parliament’s economic and monetary committee, thinks it won’t be until September that the parliament will be able to confirm a successor to Duisenberg. She told the FT, “It’s really necessary for Duisenberg to prolong his tenure… The approval of the committee takes some time.” A number of hurdles must be cleared before a president of the ECB can be confirmed: first unanimous approval from EU heads of government, then a grilling by Randzio-Plath's committee, before the European Parliament casts a deciding vote.

Whatever happens to Jean-Claude, the French are going to insist on one of their own assuming the ECB presidency. Already French lawyers are desperately scrutinising the legal viability of Christian Noyer (previously vice-president of the ECB) taking the job instead, the problem being that top ECB executives are not supposed to be reappointed. Nervous times lie ahead for the ECB, and veteran Wim Duisenberg may find himself mooching around in Frankfurt for a little longer than he bargained for.


Fazio Stands Strong
While the Banque de France is conscientiously considering cutting back its seam-splitting structure, the Banca d’Italia is apparently considering no such thing according to a recent article from Dow Jones Newswires - even though Italy is just as top heavy with central bankers as France. In fact, any kind of reform appears to be out of the question, as the governor Antonio Fazio has jealously been guarding the bank’s regulatory responsibilities over the banking sector.

Apparently, parts of a law in preparation which were aimed at clipping Fazio’s wings mysteriously vanished from the draft at the end of last year when Berlusconi himself intervened. Fazio also protested publicly. Since then talk about reforming the bank has gone all quiet. Conspiracy theorists cite conflicts of interest: the fact that Italy’s top four banks own over 50% of the central bank’s shares have caused a few squeals at lack of transparency in the decision-making process each time the central bank gives the thumbs up (or down) for mergers or acquisitions. The Banca d’Italia is proving far more resilient to reform than the once-mighty Bundesbank or the Banque de France, but for how much longer will strong-armed Fazio be able to hold out?

No Nepotism In Peru
While the problems in the BdF are all too real, the president of Peru’s central bank, Richard Webb, has come under fire for criticisms that seem to have rather less substance. The harried president admitted to Newsmakers, “it’s been a hectic time, courtesy in part of newspaper and congressional attacks on the bank.”

Webb has had the tedious task of explaining why, just because it may be true that about 20% (or 200) of the bank’s 1,027 employees are indeed related, the bank has not been violating nepotism laws. Firstly, exactly half of that group consists of marriages that occurred after joining the bank, which, he quipped, “says something about the stability of the bank's employment relationships”. The rest of them, most of whom are manual workers or lower level clerks, were hired more than 10 years ago and aren’t affected by the laws in question. In any case, Webb observes that most of these were hired when “the family link was considered a basis for trust when hiring a manual or lower-level worker, in an age when neither experience (most were hired very young) nor educational achievement played major roles.”

In fact, Webb says it was him that introduced meritocratic hiring in the bank in the first place, back in the 60s when he was head of the research department and would run graduate schemes. At the time this was seen to be pretty “revolutionary”, and Webb recalls the “aristocratic” head of personnel sneering at the “‘lower-class’ type of person” that was resultantly beginning to join the bank. Apparently this particular character has since been locked up for running a cheque carrousel with the bank's chief cashier…

Webb explained that this little matter has reared its head repeatedly over the last decade, owing to inquiries from congress that are “invariably motivated by disgruntled former employees”. And doubtless there will be more. As Webb said, for the moment, “everything suggests that the smear campaign regarding nepotism is running out of steam, but, like Old Faithful, it will probably crop up again in a few years time.”


Klein Not To Be Pushed About
In Israel relations between the central bank and government could hardly be worse. David Klein, the central bank governor, has fallen into such complete disfavour with the government that the prime minister, Ariel Sharon, is bent on replacing him with someone just a little more pliable.

Klein has had the gall to speak his mind about the government’s economic policy, most recently observing that substantial cuts in the budget would be needed to reach the government’s budget deficit target (if it is not reached, Israel risks being downgraded by credit rating agencies). For such impertinence (which looks more like normal central banker’s talk to us), Sharon has drafted in Attorney-General Elyakim Rubinstein to look into the legal feasibilities of ditching Klein. And if that is not feasible, it is reported that Sharon is prepared to initiate legislation to make it possible for him to do so. By law, Sharon can only fire Klein if he has continually demonstrated an inability or refusal to cooperate with the cabinet or to perform his duties properly.

Klein has no intention of making this easy for Sharon. A central bank official has said, “Klein will continue to make his views known and will continue to call for budget cuts and fiscal discipline.” But Sharon will not stomach such criticism, and has repeatedly asked Klein to shut up - which Klein, to his credit, refuses to do. “The governor has repeatedly stated, in his many lectures, that he is a partner in the government's economic measures,” the bank says.

But Sharon already has someone in mind: apparently he thinks former finance minister Yaakov Neeman would fit the bill nicely, although if local press reporting is anything to go by, he is the only one to think so. In fact, a lot of people think that binning your central bank governor for pursuing an anti-inflationary policy is not such a wise or confidence-enhancing move at all. Sharon also wants a new finance minister - he (Silvan Shalom) and Klein are barely able to talk to each other - and ironically Jacob Frenkel, Klein’s predecessor at the Bank of Israel from 1991 to 1999 and currently president of Merrill Lynch International, is said to be considered for the position.

But if memory serves, Frenkel had his own bust-ups with the then Israeli government. And, however brilliant an economist he may be (one of Bob Mundell's many former students), Frenkel seems to us a much more prickly character than the soft-spoken, mild, diminutive Klein.

Yamaguchi Deflates Expectations
Talking in London this week, Yutaka Yamaguchi, deputy governor of the Bank of Japan, was cajoled by the chair into talking about the introduction of an inflation target for Japan as a means of escaping the agonies of deflation. Yamaguchi was less than enthusiastic: “I had not planned to speak about inflation targeting, but I suppose I have to.” The glum prognosis continued in his final assessment with his personal view of why this oft-cited panacea for Japan's economic malady could not be administered. For Yamaguchi this would be “promising something to our people that we could not possibly deliver.” It seems that the bank, not content with expectations of deflation, seeks to deflate expectations as well.

While there was not much optimism for a rise in the price level emanating from Yamaguchi, clearly somebody at the BoJ believes that some inflation is on the way, as Newsmakers learns that the BoJ is tendering for bids to print new banknotes. Why would they want to do a thing like that? More notes will only be required if the price level is expected to increase or if the government fancies a healthier dollop of seigniorage revenue. Alternatively it might be in preparation for a helicopter drop of money over Tokyo - about the only monetary policy tool the BoJ has left.

Who Cares For Accountability Anyway?
Prevailing opinion holds that accountability is a good and desirable thing. So the One World Trust has come up with the worthy idea of measuring accountability in global institutions. Its Global Accountability Report 2003 (http://www.oneworldtrust.org/Files/Pubs/GAP%20report/GAP2003_ES.pdf - skip to page four for the most interesting bit) has surveyed a disparate bunch, from trans-national corporations, to NGOs, to inter-governmental institutions. It uses member control of an organisation and access to online information as its criteria for measuring this. While it admits these criteria are necessary but not sufficient, one wonders if there are any other “necessary” criteria that might have slipped their attention: NGOs, those paragons of democracy and transparency, topped the list for being the most accountable, while the Bank for International Settlements actually came a resounding bottom.

But so what? Well actually, if a new study released by the BIS itself (see here: http://www.bis.org/publ/work123.htm) is anything to go by, this would seem not necessarily to be a bad thing. It casts profound doubt on whether those much-lauded virtues of transparency and accountability - among central banks anyway - are really that desirable after all.

The study suggests that if central bankers would only hold their tongues a little more, the markets would be able to make up their own minds rather than be led astray by garrulous central bankers who don’t necessarily know any better: “When public information becomes entrenched in the prevailing ‘climate of opinion’ it begins to take on a life of its own, suppressing the private information of individual agents, and disrupting the channel through which the market mechanism aggregates and disseminates information on the economic fundamentals.” So, leaving aside the credibility of the above-mentioned survey, at least it shows the BIS practices what it preaches.

Martian Madness
Einars Repse, former governor of Latvia’s central bank and now the country’s prime minister - and never one to stay out of the limelight - enjoys pulling his critics’ legs. Swept to power on promises to banish corruption from Latvia, Repse is reported to have turned up for his first cabinet meeting with a pistol tucked into his belt. Separately, he has conceded: “I am a caught-out Martian and clearly nuts.” Answering detractors who said his government was failing in its promises, he observed deadpan, “As it turns out, the government is full of thieves, smugglers, bribe-takers, people who deal with suspicious business partners, foreign services and spies.”

Lean Times For Norway's Treasury
This year Norway’s Treasury is not to get a bean from the central bank, which regrets that, as its accounts show a deficit of 24.1 billion krone for 2002 (compared to a deficit of 4.7 billion in 2001), there won’t be much to go round for the government. A press release from the bank explained that the results “must be assessed against the background of Norges Bank’s responsibilities”, and pointed to how factors outside its control can lead to “wide annual fluctuations” in its accounts, highlighting how the appreciation of the krone set against the bad performance of the stock markets meant that reserves had taken a bit of a tumble. Will this make any difference to the bank’s investment strategies, one can only wonder? To see the report click here: http://www.norges-bank.no/front/pressemelding/en/2003/2003-02-20T14-17-15.fgen.html
 
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