Spring 2005 Training Courses/Seminar Series

Pursuit of Financial Stability: What Works and What Doesn't

4-day intensive residential programme, 17 April- 21 April 2005
Venue: Cumberland Lodge, Windsor

Series adviser: Charles Goodhart, CBE

Professor Emeritus, London School of Economics,Financial Markets Group


persuit of financial stability

 

PURSUIT OF FINANCIAL STABILITY:WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T

Over the last decade financial policymakers have come to understand that supervising individual financial firms is not sufficient to guarantee the stability of the financial sector as a whole. In addition to “micro prudential” supervision, financial market authorities need to monitor threats to the stability of the system as a whole.

As a result, around the world, central banks and supervisory authorities are upgrading, or creating from scratch, teams and departments to undertake “macro-prudential surveillance” aimed at safeguarding systemic stability. However, while the costs of instability and crises are well known, consensus about how to deliver financial stability is still some way away.

This course draws on the experiences of leading central banks, regulatory authorities and academic experts to examine how macro-prudential surveillance can in fact be made effective. The focus throughout is on identifying what works and what does not.

The course is structured into four sections:

What we know about financial instability: the first day of this course examines current research into financial stability (by central banks and others) and investigates the challenge posed by the central bank’s mandate to safeguard systemic stability;

Operational sing macro-prudential surveillance: the second day of the course examines how in practice leading institutions have developed tools, procedures and organizational structures to deliver on their mandate;

Unpacking the toolkit: policy levers and mitigation: critically, the ability to identify systemic vulnerabilities must be complemented by policy tools and levers which central banks and supervisors can employ to mitigate identified weaknesses. This third day draws on a series of case studies to examine how in practice this is done;

Unresolved issues and crisis management: the final session of the seminar examines critical unresolved issues, and looks at different approaches to crisis management.

The seminar meets in roundtable format to allow an international group of delegate’s maximum opportunities to learn from each other and from an elite panel of speakers. Each session of the seminar is structured to allow participating supervisors and central bankers an opportunity to “benchmark” their work against best practice internationally and to exchange views with their peers in an informal setting.

Since 1999, over 700 supervisors and central bankers have attended roundtable seminars hosted by Central Banking Publications Ltd, publishers of Central Banking journal.

We look forward to welcoming you to this new seminar in Windsor.

Yours sincerely,

William Clarke, PhD, CBE
Chairman, Central Banking Publications

 
Sunday 17th APRIL

Registration 
 
Monday 18th APRIL

WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT FINANCIAL STABILITY
 

Theories of financial instability
Professor E. Philip Davis
Professor of Economics and Finance, Brunel University andmember of the European Shadow Regulatory Committee

Effective strategies to maintain financial stability require an understanding of what causes financial instability. Fortunately, there is a considerable and growing body of research into the causes of financial crises, which central banks and regulatory authorities can draw on. This session provides an overview of this research and thus a foundation for the whole process of “macro-prudential surveillance”: the monitoring of conjunctural and structural trends in financial markets so as to give warning of the approach and potential impact of financial instability.

Empirical work on financial instability

Glenn Hoggarth
Bank of England

As important as a grounding in the economic theory on the causes of financial crises is an understanding of the empirical work on recent episodes of financial instability. The increased frequency of financial crisis over the last quarter of a century provides a wealth of empirical evidence regarding the onset, costs and outcomes of financial crises. This session reviews the lessons for both current policy and crisis management.

How can central banks deliver financial stability?
Professor Charles Goodhart
London School of Economics

Maintenance of financial stability is coming to be recognised as one of the most important objectives for a central bank. Central bank researchers and economists are at the forefront of newresearch on how this goal can be achieved. It is instructive therefore to step back and consider what this work entails. This presentation from Professor Charles Goodhart examines how infact leading central banks like the Bank of England, European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve approach this mandate. In particular, what is the best way of using limited economic analytical resources in this field?

Current threats to financial stability
Speaker to be confirmed

The International Monetary Fund, in September’s Global Financial Stability Report, argued that it was “hard to see where systemic threats could come from in the short term”. However, doubts about the sustainability of the current pattern of capital flows are increasing. Policymakers therefore must remain vigilant. This session will call on delegates to share their institutions’ assessments of current issues and threats.

 
Tuesday 19th APRIL

OPERATIONALISING MACRO-PRUDENTIAL SURVEILLANCE
 
The concept of macro-prudential surveillance
Aerdt Houben
Monetary and Economic Policy Department,De Nederlandsche Bank

Over the past decade, maintenance of financial stability has become an increasingly important objective in economic policymaking. Many central banks now have an explicit mandate to safeguard financial stability. Many also publish aregular formal review of their work in this area. This session examines how the mandate for financial stability can be “operationalised” and the micro-prudential tools which central banks and supervisors can best employ in this effort.

Data needs for macro-prudential surveillance
Martin Andersson
Head of the Financial Systems Division, Sveriges Riksbank

Macro-prudential surveillance, like all economic analysis, depends on the ability of policy makers to identify, define, collect and analyse relevant and timely information. Informational gaps, which have the potential to mask the buildupof financial sector weakness, can seriously undermine this effort. This session examines the data needed to perform macro-prudential surveillance, and looks at some of the financial soundness indicators now being tracked by institutions such as the IMF.

Procedures in macro-prudential analysis (stress tests, VARs etc.)
Jukka Vesala
Financial Supervision Authority, Finland (to be confirmed)

Surveillance of key indicators does not, by itself, provide a means of estimating the impact on the banking sector of a destabilising event, such as a sharp decline in asset prices. Once areas of vulnerability have been identified, policymakers and analysts need to determine under what conditions these weaknesses could lead to systemic stress. This session examines the use of stress tests to allow this scenario analysis, and details the experience of institutions like the European Central Bank which have adopted such scenario analysis techniques.

The organisation of macro-prudential analysis

Thorvald G. Moe
Special Adviser, Financial Stability, Norges Bank

Central banks and other national financial authorities now agree on the need for macro-prudential surveillance, which goes beyond the supervision and monitoring of individual institutions. However, despite this agreement, a “template” for delivering financial stability is very far from complete. How, for instance, should those engaged in macro-prudential surveillance cooperate with front-line (“micro-prudential”) supervisors? How should the financial stability department be reorganized and managed? How can national and international financial policymakers best cooperate in this endeavour? This session will examine how leading central banks have approached these challenges.
 
Wednesday 20th APRIL

POLICY LEVERS AND RISK MITIGATION
 

The role of bank capital regulation in risk mitigation
Patricia Jackson
Partner, Risk Management Practice, Ernst and Young,(former Head of Financial Industry and Regulation Division,Bank of England)

Capital, and regulatory requirements to maintain its level, has long been seen as the critical instrument by which financial market authorities can reduce instances of systemic distress. Currently however, market-generated capital requirements can be as important as regulatory minima.

This session examines how regulators and central banks can use the tool of regulatory capital requirements, with particular emphasis on the new Basel rules currently being implemented.


The current array of policy tools
Speaker to be confirmed

Once central banks and supervisors have identified vulnerabilities, what policy tools and levers do they have available to mitigate them? Clearly, front-line supervisors can work to safeguard the integrity of individual institutions, but how can central banks, outside times of crisis, influence financial stability? In fact, central banks have a range of preventive tools. These include standard setting, performing oversight (for instance of payment systems), and providing the market with analyses and assessment of developing threats. This session examines these options.

Mitigating risks in payments systems
Speaker to be confirmed

In recent years increasing attention has been paid to the systemic risks of payment systems and their prevention. Wide ranging payment system disturbances can paralyse large parts of society and cause considerable costs to payment system users. An economic crisis can spread via payment systems from bank to bank or even country to country if the systems do not include effective firewalls and contingency plans for cases of operational distress. This session examines current work to increase the resiliency of payment systems.
 
Thursday 21th April

FUTURE CHALLENGES

Liquidity management in banking crises
Marc Quintyn
International Monetary Fund

The central bank’s ability to inject liquidity into markets and individual institutions is one of the key policy levers available to financial market authorities in a crisis. Keen to avoid moral hazard, many authorities have traditionally declined to discuss their policy stance on the grounds of “constructive ambiguity”. However, recent thinking is investigating whether central banks should adopt a less ambiguous and more structured approach to their provision of liquidity support. This session examines recent episodes of central bank liquidity support, and examine show lender-of-last-resort policy can best minimise/mitigate problems.

Financial instability in a securitised world: market liquidity risk, credit derivatives
Speaker to be confirmed


Increasing securitisation fundamentally changes the linkages between financial firms. Credit is often now provided directly through market processes as opposed to indirectly through financial intermediaries. While this may help to diversify risk out of the banking sector, it may also erode “relationship banking” and thus banks’ monitoring of borrowers. In addition, securitised markets may be more volatile, particularly when under stress. This session examines the financial stability implications of this trend.

 
   
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